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I. INTRODUCTION
In an effort to combat employment discrimination against pres-
ent and prospective employees, Congress enacted Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,' the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 (ADEA),2 and the Equal Pay Act of 1963. 3 Although
these statutes define the terms "employer" and "employee," they do
not specifically address whether partners can qualify as employees in
employment discrimination actions.4 Thus, in a growing number of
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1982).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623-634 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982).
4. Congress has adopted several statutes that address discriminatory employment
practices. This Comment will confine its discussion to Title VII, the ADEA, and the Equal
Pay Act because they currently represent the only federal employment discrimination statutes
under which the issue of whether partners can qualify as employees has arisen. See infra text
accompanying notes 47-152. Although outside the scope of this Comment, other federal
statutes that prohibit employment discrimination include the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1982), the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982), the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
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cases, 5 courts have struggled with the issue of whether partners in
general partnerships should be permitted to invoke the protections of
these antidiscrimination laws.6 The majority of courts that have faced
this question have held that a partner's unique status as co-owner and
manager of the partnership precludes that partner from qualifying as
an employee.7
Considerable uncertainty remains as to the status of partners
under these statutes, however, because the courts that have con-
fronted the issue generally have relied upon faulty assumptions
regarding the operation of modern partnerships, and have otherwise
failed to rigorously analyze the issue. The courts, therefore, have yet
to determine conclusively whether, and under what circumstances,
§ 2000d (1982). For a discussion of the various federal statutes that prohibit employment
discrimination, see P. Cox, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION (1987); G. RUTHERGLEN,
MAJOR ISSUES IN THE FEDERAL LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION (1983); C.
SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION (1980) [hereinafter C. SULLIVAN].
5. Between 1978 and 1983, the total number of partnerships in the service industry in the
United States increased from 241,000 to 306,000, and the number of partners increased from
783,000 to 1,275,000. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 1987, at 506 (107th ed. 1987). This tremendous growth has increased the
probability that partners will bring more discrimination claims against partnerships. Wheeler
v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 266 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 503 (1987).
6. Courts Split on Whether Partners Are "Employees" Under Discrimination Laws, 56
U.S.L.W. 1021 (Aug. 11, 1987). The question of whether partners may be considered
employees has arisen in other contexts. In most states, for example, a partner cannot receive
workmen's compensation because he is not considered an employee. See A. BROMBERG,
CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP 24 (1968); see also IC A. LARSON, THE LAW OF
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 54.30 (1986) ("With the exception of Oklahoma and
Louisiana, every state that has dealt judicially with the status of 'working partners' or joint
venturers has held that they cannot be employees."). The courts have reached this conclusion
through the use of the aggregate theory of partnership, whereby the partner "is an employer,
which precludes his being an employee. As an entrepreneur, he does not belong to the working
class for whose benefit compensation acts were passed." A. BROMBERG, supra, at 24; see also
A. LARSON, supra, at § 54.31 ("[Because] the partnership is nothing more than the aggregate
of the individuals making it up, a partner-employee would also be an employer. The
compensation act cannot be supposed to have contemplated any such combination of employer
and employee status in one person."). Under the aggregate theory of partnership, a
partnership is not treated collectively as an entity, but rather, it is viewed as a group of
individuals. A. BROMBERG, supra, at 18-19. In a minority of jurisdictions, however, a partner
can receive workmen's compensation under the entity theory of partnership. See A.
BROMBERG, supra, at 24; see also A. LARSON, supra, at § 54.30-.3 1. Under the entity theory of
partnership, a partnership is "a distinct entity or legal person separate and distinct from the
persons composing it as in the case of the corporation." F. MECHEM, ELEMENTS OF THE
LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 8 (1920). For an examination of the conflict between the aggregate
and entity theories of partnership, see Crane, The Uniform Partnership Act: A Criticism, 28
HARV. L. REV. 762 (1915); Crane, The Uniform Partnership Act and Legal Persons, 29 HARV.
L. REV. 838 (1916); Jensen, Is a Partnership Under the Uniform Partnership Act an Aggregate
or an Entity?, 16 VAND. L. REV. 377 (1963); Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act-A Reply to
Mr. Crane's Criticism, 29 HARV. L. REV. 158 (1915).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 47-78 & 90-130.
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Congress intended to allow partners to prosecute claims of employ-
ment discrimination.8  Few partners have initiated suits in this con-
text because until recently, the number of women and minorities in
professional partnerships was negligible.9 As women and minorities
enter professional schools, and subsequently into professional partner-
ships with increasing frequency, the number of discrimination claims
is likely to grow significantly." ° Courts must therefore determine
whether to afford partners the protections of the employment discrim-
ination statutes.
The determination of whether a partner qualifies as an employee
often turns on whether a true partnership relationship exists. Resolv-
ing this question, however, is not a simple process"-especially in
light of the antiquated notions that pervade the present understanding
of modern partnerships, their members, and their operations. 2 Such
notions impede any attempt to establish standards for distinguishing a
partner from an employee. This Comment suggests a viable approach
to the issue that is consistent with Congress' intent in enacting the
employment discrimination statutes. Section II of this Comment
examines the statutory language relating to employee coverage under
Title VII, the ADEA, and the Equal Pay Act. This Section also
reviews the various tests that courts have implemented to construe the
term "employee" under these statutes. Section III focuses specifically
on the different approaches that federal courts have taken to decide
whether partners may be considered employees. Finally, Section IV
rejects the various approaches taken by the federal courts and con-
cludes that in light of the language, history, and purpose of the federal
8. According to one court, there is currently no logical test to distinguish a partner from
an employee under federal employment discrimination statutes. Caruso v. Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co., 664 F. Supp. 144, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
9. See Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 266-67; see also Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in
High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 947, 948 (1982) (noting the historical absence of blacks in
"jobs with high pay or status, or with significant social or political power.").
10. Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 266.
11. Caruso, 664 F. Supp. at 148.
12. Professor Hillman has noted that "partnership law has not been tested against the
conditions under which partnerships today operate." Hillman, Private Ordering Within
Partnerships, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 429 (1987). In additon, Professor Hillman has raised
questions that focus on how partnerships truly function:
How many partnerships are formed without written agreements? What do
partners assume concerning the norms that will govern their conduct? Do
partners regard themselves as fiduciaries? What types of bargaining activities
occur when the parties do not focus their attention on development of a written
partnership agreement? Is bargaining an activity that takes place continuously
throughout the life of a partnership? How important are non-economic interests,
such as status and self-esteem, to partners? How egalitarian are partnerships?
1988]
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employment discrimination statutes, partners should be permitted,
under certain circumstances, to invoke the protections given to
employees under these laws.
II. WHO IS AN "EMPLOYEE" UNDER THE FEDERAL
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STATUTES?
A. The Statutory Definitions of the Term "Employee"
The determination of whether a partner may be considered an
employee under the Equal Pay Act, Title VII, and the ADEA must
commence with an examination of the term "employee" as it is
defined in these statutes. In 1963, Congress enacted the Equal Pay
Act as an amendment to section 6 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938 (FLSA).' 3 The Equal Pay Act codifies the principle of "equal
pay for equal work" by prohibiting employers from paying disparate
wages to their employees on the basis of gender.14 The Equal Pay Act
provides that "the term 'employee' means any individual employed by
an employer." 15 This definition of "employee," however, is vague and
circular, and does not directly address the status of partners.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers
from discriminating against present or prospective employees on the
basis of race, color, gender, religion, or national origin. 16 The statute
13. See C. SULLIVAN, supra note 4, at 587 ("[The Equal Pay Act] contains only a few
coverage provisions of its own, looking mainly to the FLSA to define its reach.").
14. Section 3 of the Equal Pay Act provides in relevant part:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall
discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed,
between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such
establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of
the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of
which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed
under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant
to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures
earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any
other factor other than sex: Provided, That an employer who is paying a wage
rate differential in violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with
the provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee.
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1982).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (1982).
16. Section 703(a) of Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(]) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
8 DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PAR TNERS
defines "employee" as "an individual employed by an employer."7
Because of the circularity and ambiguity of this definition, one can
only speculate whether the term "employee" encompasses partners
under Title VII. 18 In addition, the statutory exemptions to the defini-
tion of "employee," although explicitly excluding certain individuals,
do not cover partners. 19
The ADEA emanated from a series of civil rights laws that began
with the passage of the Equal Pay Act of 1963, and continued with
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of
1965.20 The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to discrimi-
nate against present or prospective employees on the basis of age,2
and employs a definition of "employee" that is nearly identical to that
found in the Equal Pay Act and Title VII.22 The ADEA, therefore,
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1982).
18. See C. SULLIVAN, supra note 4, at 94 ("Title VII does not, in its definition of
,employer' or 'employee,' indicate what tests will be applied in this regard, with the result that
several decisions have had to wrestle with the question of when 'employment' leaves off and
some other form of business association begins.").
19. Section 701(f) of Title VII, which contains a definition of the term "employee,"
provides:
[T]he term "employee" shall not include any person elected to public office in
any State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or
any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal staff, or an
appointee on the policy making level or an immediate adviser with respect to the
exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office. The exemption set
forth in the preceding sentence shall not include employees subject to the civil
service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1982).
20. J. KALET, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 1 (1986).
21. Section 4(a) of the ADEA provides:
It shall be unlawful for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this
chapter.
29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1982). For an examination of the ADEA in the context of the compelled
retirement of partners in law firms, see Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act and
Mandatory Retirement of Law Firm Partners, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1679 (1980).
22. Section 11 (a) of the ADEA provides the following definition of "employee":
The term "employee" means an individual employed by any employer except
that the term "employee" shall not include any person elected to public office in
any State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or
1988]
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provides no guidance to determine whether Congress intended to pro-
tect partners from age discrimination.
Similarly, the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA), which the major-
ity of jurisdictions has adopted,23 fails to provide definitive guidance
for determining whether partners should be considered employees.
The UPA defines a partnership as "an association of two or more
persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit."' 24 The UPA is
useful in ascertaining whether a particular individual is a partner
because it identifies certain attributes that are traditionally indicative
of partner status.2 1 It does not, however, address whether a partner
may qualify simultaneously as an employer and employee. Further-
more, the UPA's utility is severely limited because partners may over-
ride the UPA's provisions by entering into a written agreement.26
The UPA, therefore, applies only if the partners are in dispute regard-
ing an aspect of the partnership's operations.2 7  Thus, an individual
may be a partner under the UPA even if those traditional attributes of
the partnership relationship that are identified in the statute are
absent with regard to certain "partners."
Because the statutory language of the federal employment dis-
crimination statutes fails to indicate whether a partner can invoke the
protections given to employees, and the decisions of administrative
any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal staff, or an
appointee on the policymaking level or an immediate adviser with respect to the
exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office. The exemption set
forth in the preceding sentence shall not include employees subject to the civil
service laws of a State government, governmental agency, or political
subdivision. The term "employee" includes any individual who is a citizen of the
United States employed by an employer in a workplace in a foreign country.
29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
23. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT, 6 U.L.A. I (Supp. 1984).
24. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 6(1), 6 U.L.A. 22 (1969).
25. Under section 7(4) of the UPA, for example, with certain specified exceptions, partner
status may be inferred if an individual receives a share of business profits. 6 U.L.A. 39 (1969).
Sections 9, 13, and 14 of the UPA make it clear that partners are agents of the partnership, and
as such, they may bind the partnership. Id. at 132, 163, 173. Partners may be jointly and
severally liable for debts of the partnership under section 15 of the UPA. Id. at 174.
Additionally, under section 18(e), partners are equally entitled to manage and operate the
partnership. Id. at 213.
26. See B. DEFREN, PARTNERSHIP DESK BOOK 16-17 (1978); see also A. BROMBERG,
supra note 6, at 365 ("The incidents of the relation as between the partners are subject to such
agreements as they may make .... If the partners make no specific agreements with regard to
certain details, the law applies rules which are in accordance with mercantile usage.").
27. See B. DEFREN, supra note 26, at 3 ("The provisions of [the UPA] generally govern
the rules of behavior for the members of a partnership, but a binding agreement can vary most
of the Act's provisions as they affect the relationship of the partners to each other."); Hillman,
supra note 12, at 433 ("Deference to agreements is a recurring theme of the U.P.A., which
expressly subordinates many of its more important provisions to contrary agreements between
partners.").
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PARTNERS
28agencies interpreting these statutes shed little light on this issue, areview of the judicial construction of the term "employee" is required.
B. The Judicial Construction of the Term "Employee"
Before a plaintiff may invoke the protections afforded by federal
employment discrimination statutes, he must show that an employ-
ment relationship exists between him and the defendant. 9 Deciding
whether partners can establish the requisite employment relationship
under these laws poses a new inquiry for the courts. In cases arising
under the employment discrimination laws, courts have found it nec-
essary to adopt employee coverage tests that were developed in other
contexts to distinguish between employees and independent
contractors.30
In Title VII cases, for example, courts have employed three dif-
ferent tests to determine whether a particular individual is an
28. H. EGLIT, AGE DISCRIMINATION § 16.04 (1987) ("[T]he Department of Labor merely
indicated that the term employee included an applicant for employment; the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission guidelines simply refer to the statutory definition.").
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is the agency responsible for
interpreting and enforcing Title VII, the ADEA, and the Equal Pay Act. Wheeler v.
Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 265-67 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 503 (1987); Hyland v. New
Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793, 797 (2d Cir. 1986). In a case in which a female law
clerk brought a claim for sex discrimination against a law firm partnership that employed her,
the EEOC addressed the question of whether some or all of the individual partners of the
partnership could be considered employees under Title VII. EEOC Dec. No. 85-4, 2 Empl.
Prac. Guide (CCH) 6,846 (Mar. 18, 1985). In this case, the EEOC did not view the partners
as employees because each had an equal voice in the control and management of the firm, and
shared the profits and losses from the enterprise among themselves. Id. In holding that the
partners could not be considered employees under Title VII, the EEOC noted that, in some
circumstances, persons who have the status of partner may in reality be employees. Id. n.4.
The EEOC specified some of the factors that it would consider: "In determining whether the
individual is a partner or an employee in a particular case, the Commission will consider
relevant factors including, but not limited to, the individual's ability to control and operate the
business and to determine compensation and the administration of profits and losses." Id.
The EEOC, however, has not consistently followed this approach to determine employee
status. See Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 265-67.
29. See Hyland, 794 F.2d at 796 (stating that the ADEA's "protection extends only to
those individuals who are in a direct employment relationship with an employer, and that a
claim under its provisions lies solely in favor of a person who is an employee at the time of
termination"); Kyles v. Calcasieu Parish Sheriff's Dep't, 395 F. Supp. 1307, 1310 (W.D. La.
1975) ("[A]n employer-employee relationship is an essential element of coverage under [Title
VII]. There is no such relationship here.... [T]herefore ... this Court is without jurisdiction
over those portions of the complaint which would rest on Title VII."); C. SULLIVAN, supra
note 4, at 587 ("As with Title VII, a prerequisite for FLSA coverage [of which the Equal Pay
Act is an amendment] is an employer-employee relationship, a concept which may raise such
problems as distinguishing 'employees' from 'independent contradtors' or other
relationships.").
30. See, e.g., Mares v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1985); EEOC v. Zippo Mfg. Co.,
713 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1983); Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1983).
1988]
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employee or an independent contractor.3 Under the common law
"right-to-control" test,32 a person is an employee-not an independ-
ent contractor-if the person for whom the work is being performed
reserves the right to control the end product, as well as the details and
means of achieving that result.33
The second test that courts have applied to determine employee
status under Title VII is an "economic realities" test.34 Under this
test, the court determines employee coverage by examining "the eco-
nomic realities underlying the relationship between the individual and
the so-called principal in an effort to determine whether that individ-
ual is likely to be susceptible to the discriminatory practices which the
31. See, e.g., Broussard v. L.H. Bossier, Inc., 789 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1986); Armbruster v.
Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1983); Smith v. Dutra Trucking Co., 410 F. Supp. 513 (N.D.
Cal. 1976), aff'd, 580 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1978).
32. Dutra, 410 F. Supp. at 516.
33. Id. Before 1947, the common law right-to-control test was the gegerally accepted
standard for distinguishing employees from independent contractors. Zippo, 713 F.2d at 36.
The Dutra court, however, rejected cases that were decided after 1947 that called for the
application of a much broader test in suits involving such federal social legislation as the Fair
Labor Standards Act, the Social Security Act and the National Labor Relations Act. Dutra,
410 F. Supp. at 516. In adopting the common law test, the Dutra court relied on the judicial
construction of "employee" under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), ch. 372, 49
Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (Supp. 11 1984). Id. Any
review of the decisions interpreting "employee" under the NLRA is beneficial to an
understanding of Congressional intent in enacting Title VII because Congress specifically
modeled Title VII after the NLRA. Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1341 (6th Cir.
1983). In the landmark case of NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., the Supreme Court of the
United States construed the term "employee" under the NLRA. 322 U.S. 11, 113 (1944).
The NLRA's definition of employee is just as ambiguous and circular as the definition
contained in Title VII. Section 2(3) of the NLRA provides in relevant part: "The term
Iemployee' shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a
particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise." 29 U.S.C. § 152(2)
(1982). The Supreme Court in Hearst found that the common law right-to-control test was too
restrictive, and stated that the term "employee" in the NLRA must be broadly construed "in
doubtful situations, by underlying economic facts rather than technically and exclusively by
previously established legal classifications," with a view toward fulfilling the purpose of the
Act. 322 U.S. at 129.
Twenty-four years after the Hearst decision, however, the Court again faced the question
as to the proper test that courts should utilize to distinguish employees from independent
contractors under the NLRA. In NLRB v. United Insurance Company of America, the Court
adopted the traditional common law agency test as the standard for determining employee
status. 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968). The principal reason why the Court departed from the
expansive Hearst test was because Congress, in its adverse reaction to the Hearst Court's
interpretation of the NLRA, passed an amendment that explicitly excluded independent
contractors from the NLRA's definition of "employee." Id. Thus, the Dutra court believed
that Congress intended for courts to determine employee coverage under Title VII by applying
the traditional common law test because of the Supreme Court's construction of "employee"
under the NLRA, and because of the Dutra court's failure to discover any Congressional
intent to the contrary in Title VII's legislative history. Dutra, 410 F. Supp. at 516.
34. Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1341.
[Vol. 42:699
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act was designed to eliminate."35 In contrast to the common law
right-to-control test, the economic realities test gives the term
"employee" an expansive meaning by requiring it to be construed in
light of the purpose to be achieved under the statute and the evil that
Congress sought to eradicate. 36  The determinative question under
this test is whether the individual so depends upon the business with
which he is connected that he comes within the protection of Title
VII, or is "sufficiently independent to lie outside its ambit. ' '37
The third, and most common, test that courts utilize in Title VII
cases to determine employee status is a hybrid of the economic reali-
ties and the common law right-to-control tests.3" Under the hybrid
35. Id. at 1340. The Supreme Court of the United States first applied this test in NLRB v.
Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 113, 132 (1944) (In applying the test to determine
whether newsboys were employees or independent contractors under the NLRA, the Court
held that the National Labor Relations Board's determination that the newsboys were
employees was supported by the record and had a rational basis in the law). See supra note 33.
36. Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1340. Courts have also applied the economic realities test in
cases arising under the Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 30.1-1397 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)), and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch.
676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). In
United States v. Silk, the Supreme Court of the United States found the traditional common
law right-to-control test inappropriate for determining employee coverage under the Social
Security Act. 331 U.S. 704, 713-14 (1947). Rather, the Court used the economic realities test
that it earlier had espoused in the context of the National Labor Relations Act. Id. The Court
stated that "degrees of control, opportunities for profit or loss, investment in facilities,
permanency of relation and skill required" were significant factors to consider under the
economic realities test, without any single factor disposing of the existence of an employment
relationship. Id. at 716. Seven days after deciding Silk, the Court confirmed the propriety of
applying the economic realities test under the Social Security Act. Bartels v. Birmingham, 332
U.S. 126, 130 (1947). In Bartels, the Court recognized the element of control as a traditional
characteristic of the employer-employee relationship but reasoned that "in the application of
social legislation employees are those who as a matter of economic reality are dependent upon
the business to which they render service." Id. Under the Bartels test, courts must examine
the total relationship along with the Silk factors. Id.
Courts generally apply the economic realities test in cases arising under the FLSA.
Donovan v. New Floridian Hotel, Inc., 676 F.2d 468, 470 (1 1th Cir. 1982) ("It is well-
established that the issue of whether an employment relationship exists under the FLSA must
be judged by the 'economic realities' of the individual case."); Real v. Driscoll Strawberry
Assocs., Inc., 603 F.2d 748, 755 (9th Cir. 1979) ("Economic realities, not contractual labels,
determine employment status for the remedial purposes of the FLSA."). Courts have been
reluctant, however, to use the economic realities test in Title VII cases. See EEOC v. Zippo
Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32, 37 (3d Cir. 1983).
37. Usery v. Pilgrim Equip. Co., 527 F.2d 1308, 1311-12 (5th Cir.) (reasoning that "[i]t is
dependence that indicates employee status"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 826 (1976). For an
illustration of how the economic realities test is applied under social legislation such as the
FLSA, see Mednick v. Albert Enters., Inc., 508 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1975).
38. Comment, The Application of Antidiscrimination Statutes to Shareholders of
Professional Corporations.: Forcing Fellow Shareholders Out of the Club, 55 FORDHAM L. REV.
839, 844 (1987) (maintaining that true partners are not employees under the federal
employment discrimination laws whether courts apply the common law agency test, the
economic realities test, or the hybrid test). For a contrary view, see Paone & Reis, Effective
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test, the economic realities of the work relationship is a significant
consideration, but the primary focus is on the degree of control that
the employer may exercise over an individual's performance of his
responsibilities. "
The tests for determining employee status in Title VII cases also
apply to cases arising under the ADEA and the Equal Pay Act.
These statutes not only define "employee" similarly, but also, they
have the common purpose of prohibiting employers from discriminat-
ing against employees.4° In addition, courts generally agree that the
Enforcement of Federal Nondiscrimination Provisions in the Hiring of Lawyers, 40 S. CAL. L.
REV. 615, 639-40 (1967) ("Using either the common law test or the Social Security test, there
are some partners who should be considered employees who are protected by federal
nondiscrimination controls.").
39. Mares v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 1066, 1067 (5th Cir. 1985) (discussing the common law test,
the economic realities test, and the hybrid test, and listing the various jurisdictions in which
they have been adopted). The hybrid test was first articulated in Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613
F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See Comment, The Definition of "Employee" Under Title VII:
Distinguishing Between Employees and Independent Contractors, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 203, 214
(1984). The Spirides court listed the following factors for courts to consider under the hybrid
test:
1) [T]he kind of occupation, with reference to whether the work usually is done
under the direction of a supervisor or is done by a specialist without supervision;
2) the skill required in the particular occupation; 3) whether the "employer" or
the individual in question furnishes the equipment used and the place of work;
4) the length of time during which the individual has worked; 5) the method of
payment, whether by time or by the job; 6) the manner in which the work
relationship is terminated; i.e. by one or both parties, with or without notice and
explanation; 7) whether annual leave is afforded; 8) whether the work is an
integral part of the business of the "employer"; 9) whether the worker
accumulates retirement benefits; 10) whether the "employer" pays social security
taxes; and 11) the intention of the parties.
Spirides, 613 F.2d at 832. Under the economic realities test, an individual is deemed an
employee if he is economically dependent upon the business to which he renders service.
Under the hybrid test, however, "it is the economic realities of the relationship viewed in light
of the common law principles of agency and the right of the employer to control the employee
that are determinative." Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337, 341 (1 th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 874 (1982). For examples of cases in which courts have applied the hybrid test under
Title VII, see Broussard v. L.H. Bossier, Inc., 789 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1986); Lutcher v. Musi-
cians Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1980); Amarnare v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen-
ner & Smith, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 770 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1985).
40. Compare Silver v. KCA, Inc., 586 F.2d 138, 141 (9th Cir. 1978) ("The specific evil at
which Title VII was directed was not the eradication of all discrimination by private
individuals, undesirable though that is, but the eradication of discrimination by employers
against employees.") with EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 759 F.2d 1523, 1524 (11th Cir. 1985)
("Congress passed the ADEA in 1967 to protect older workers against discrimination in the
workplace.") and Ende v. Board of Regents of Regency Universities, 757 F.2d 176, 183 (7th
Cir. 1985) ("Although the Equal Pay Act is narrowly focused on the problem of wage
differentials based on sex its broad remedial purpose is the elimination of sexual discrimination
against women.") and Shultz v. American Can Co., 424 F.2d 356, 360 (8th Cir. 1970) ("[T]he
elimination of gender discrimination and the raising of the level of women's wages" were
included in the broad remedial purposes of the Equal Pay Act.).
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remedial nature of these statutes necessitates liberal construction.4'
Consequently, decisions that construe a provision of one of these stat-
utes may be persuasive authority for construing similar provisions
contained in the other statutes.42
In cases arising under the ADEA, courts are divided as to the
proper test for determining employee status. In Hickey v. Arkla
Industries, Inc.,43 for example, the Fifth Circuit applied the expansive
economic realities test, but expressed "no opinion on whether it or
one of the tests used in Title VII cases should ultimately be used to
determine employee status in ADEA cases." The Third Circuit,
however, has adopted the hybrid test in the ADEA context.45
Because the Equal Pay Act is an amendment to the FLSA, and
courts have routinely used the economic realities test in cases arising
under the FLSA, there is a strong inference that the economic reali-
ties test is appropriate for determining whether a person is an
employee under the Equal Pay Act.4 6
41. See Hein v. Oregon College of Educ., 718 F.2d 910, 913 (9th Cir. 1983) ("The Equal
Pay Act is broadly remedial, and it should be construed and applied so as to fulfill the
underlying purposes which Congress sought to achieve.") (quoting Corning Glass Works v.
Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 208 (1974)); Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1336 (6th Cir. 1983)
("To effectuate its purpose of eradicating the evils of employment discrimination, Title VII
should be given a liberal construction."); Dartt v: Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir.
1976) ("The ADEA is remedial and humanitarian legislation and should be liberally
interpreted to effectuate the congressional purpose of ending age discrimination in
employment."), aff'd, 434 U.S. 99 (1977).
42. See EEOC v. Reno, 758 F.2d 581, 583-84 (11th Cir. 1985) ("[Because] the 'pro-
hibitions of the ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title VII,' . . . decisions under the
analogous section of Title VII [are] highly relevant to the issue [of the personal staff exemption
of the ADEA].") (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978)); Odomes v. Nucare,
Inc., 653 F.2d 246, 250 (6th Cir. 1981) ("The analysis of a claim of unequal pay for equal work
is essentially the same under both the Equal Pay Act and Title VII."); Hodgson v. First Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n of Broward County, Fla., 455 F.2d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 1972) ("With a few
minor exceptions the prohibitions of [the ADEA] are in terms identical to those of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 except that 'age' has been substituted for 'race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.' ").
43. 699 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1983).
44. Id. at 751. The case involved the issue of whether a manufacturer's sales
representative was an employee under the ADEA. Id.
45. EEOC v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32, 38 (3d Cir. 1983). According to one
commentator, the economic realities test that developed in cases arising under the FLSA is the
proper test that for determining employee coverage under the ADEA, rather than the hybrid
test. See Comment Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Zippo Manufacturing
Co.: Choice of a Test for Coverage of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 64 B.U. L.
REV. 1145, 1185 (1984) (contending that Zippo was incorrectly decided).
46. Brennan v. Partida, 492 F.2d 707, 709 (5th Cir. 1974); see supra note 13 and
accompanying text. In Blankenship v. Western Union Telephone Co., the Fourth Circuit held
that the FLSA does not apply to partnerships. 161 F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1947). The Blankenship
court stated, however, that it did not hold "that members of partnerships may not, acting
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III. CAN A PARTNER QUALIFY AS AN "EMPLOYEE"?
A. The Per Se Rule
In Burke v. Friedman,47 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit became one of the first courts to determine
whether partners can qualify as employees under federal employment
discrimination legislation. The plaintiff in Burke sued an accounting
firm that was organized as a partnership, and the individual partners,
alleging that the partnership discriminated against her with regard to
employment terms and conditions, and discharged her on the basis of
gender in violation of Title VII.48 Because Title VII applies only to
employers with fifteen or more employees, and the defendant firm
employed only thirteen employees, both parties agreed that Title VII
would apply to the defendant firm only if the individual partners also
qualified as employees under the statute.49 The district court held
that the partners' roles could not be that of employer and employee,
and therefore granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the case for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 0 The court reasoned that because
the defendants had hired and fired the plaintiff, they must have been
her employer." The Seventh Circuit, on appeal, confronted the ques-
tion of whether the lower court erred in refusing to view the individ-
ual partners as employees within the meaning of Title VII's definition
of "employee." 52 In holding that the defendant partners were not
employees under Title VII, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's order.53 Because the court perceived a partnership as an asso-
ciation of co-owners who control and manage a business and share in
the resulting profits and losses, it could not envision partners as
employees.54 Although the Burke court "recognize[d] that 'Title
VII's definition of "employee" is not restrictive, [and that] the exist-
ence of such a status for a certain individual must turn on the facts of
purely in their individual capacities, be 'employees' under the Act," therefore suggesting that
partners may be employees under the FLSA. Id. at 169.
47. 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977).
48. Id. at 868.
49. Id. at 868-69.
50. Id. at 869.
51. Id. As a consequence of this finding, the defendants did not meet Title VII's
jurisdictional requirement of fifteen or more employees. Id. at 868-69. Title VII's provisions
only apply to employers that are "engaged in an industry affecting commerce [and have] fifteen
or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982).
52. 556 F.2d at 868-69. The court stated that "[t]he narrow question which is raised in
this case is whether a partner can be an employee within the meaning of § 2000e(f) despite the
fact that the partnership can be an employer pursuant to § 2000e(b)." Id.
53. Id. at 870.
54. Id. at 869.
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each case,' "" it maintained that Title VII "does not expand the defi-
nition of employee to include a partner."56 The court in Burke thus
adopted a per se rule that partners cannot be considered employees
under Title VII.57
In EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd.,58 the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed
its reluctance to equate partners with employees under Title VII.5 9
The court in Dowd faced the question of whether shareholders in a
professional corporation, who were engaged in the practice of law,
were employees of that corporation under Title VIO.6 In disposing of
this question, the Seventh Circuit held that shareholders of a profes-
sional corporation could not qualify as employees.6' The court per-
ceived "no reason to treat the shareholders of a professional
corporation differently for purposes of Title VII actions than [it] did
partners of the accounting firm in Burke."62
The Eleventh Circuit, in Hishon v. King & Spalding,63 also
adopted the per se rule that partners cannot be considered employees.
The plaintiff in Hishon initiated a Title VII suit against the defendant
law firm, contending that the defendant discriminated against her on
the basis of sex by refusing to invite her into its partnership.64 To
establish the necessary employment relationship under Title VII, the
plaintiff asserted that the partners in the law firm were treated in a
way that was similar to the way in which corporate employees are
treated.65 The district court, however, held that Title VII is inappli-
cable to partnership decisions and dismissed the case for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.66
On appeal, the plaintiff exhorted the court "to adopt an 'eco-
nomic reality' test for determining whether the partners at King &
Spalding [were] 'employees.' "67 The Eleventh Circuit, however,
55. Id. (quoting McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 896, reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 1050 (1972)).
56. Id. at 870.
57. Id.
58. 736 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1984).
59. Id. at 1178.
60. Id. at 1177.
61. Id. at 1178.
62. Id. The Second Circuit rejected this approach in Hyland v. New Haven Radiology
Associates, in which the court stated: "We disagree with the Seventh Circuit and hold that the
use of the corporate form precludes any examination designed to determine whether the entity
is in fact a partnership." 794 F.2d 793, 798 (2d Cir. 1986).
63. 678 F.2d 1022 (1 1th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
64. Id. at 1024.
65. Id. at 1026.
66. Id. at 1024.
67. Id. at 1027 n.9.
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adopted the test employed by the Fifth Circuit in Calderon v. Martin
County,68 in which the Fifth Circuit stated that the status of "an
employee under Title VII is a question of federal, rather than of state,
law; it is to be ascertained through consideration of the statutory lan-
guage of the Act, its legislative history, existing federal case law, and
the particular circumstances of the case at hand. ' ' 69 Although the
Hishon court found that the statutory language and legislative history
of Title VII did not provide a basis upon which to consider partners
as employees, ° it found the Burke decision insightful, and in accord-
ance with Burke, refused to equate partners with employees."1 The
Eleventh Circuit found "a clear distinction between employees of a
corporation and partners of a law firm." 2 The Hishon court therefore
affirmed the lower court's dismissal, holding that Title VII is inappli-
cable to partnership decisions.73 The fact that the partners owned the
partnership and practiced law as "joint venturers"74 played a decisive
role in the court's analysis.7 5 The court stated that "[t]he very essence
of a partnership is the voluntary joinder of all partners with each
other."'7 6 The court further stated that it was "unwilling to dictate
partnership decisions under the guise of employee promotions pro-
tected by Title VII." 7 Consistent with the Dowd decision, the Elev-
enth Circuit thus adopted the mindset that the roles of partner and
employee are mutually exclusive.7 "
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the judgment
of the Eleventh Circuit, 9 holding that the plaintiff's complaint in
68. 639 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1981).
69. Id. at 272-73. In Calderon, the Fifth Circuit addressed the question of whether the
district court erred in dismissing the plaintiff's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
because the complaint presented a factual question of whether the plaintiff was an employee
under Title VII. Id. at 272.
70. Hishon, 678 F.2d at 1027.
71. Id. at 1027-28.
72. Id. at 1028.
73. Id. at 1024.
74. A joint venture is defined as "an association created by co-owners of a business
undertaking differing from partnership (if at all) in having a more limited scope. In all
important respects, the joint venture is treated as a partnership." A. BROMBERG, supra note 6,
at 189.
75. Hishon, 678 F.2d at 1028. The court further stated that "King & Spalding operates as
a partnership under the laws of Georgia. It files tax returns as a partnership. It is comprised of
fifty active partners and employs approximately fifty associates . . . . It has a lengthy





79. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79 (1984).
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Hishon stated a valid cause of action under Title. VII.8° The Court
reasoned that "in appropriate circumstances partnership considera-
tion may qualify as a term, condition, or privilege of a person's
employment with an employer large enough to be covered by Title
VII."' The Court thereby avoided the plaintiff's argument in
Hishon 82 that the partners of the defendant law firm were employees
of the partnership rather than owners.83 Thus, the Supreme Court
left open the question of whether partners can qualify as employees
under the federal employment discrimination laws.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell stated that the "Court's
opinion should not be read as extending Title VII to the management
of a law firm by its partners. The reasoning of the Court's opinion
does not require that the relationship among partners be character-
ized as an 'employment' relationship to which Title VII would
apply." 4 He perceived a significant difference between the relation-
ship among law partners and the relationship between an employer
and employee.8 5 Justice Powell cautioned, however, that "an
employer may not evade the strictures of Title VII simply by labeling
its employees as 'partners,' "86 thereby creating a "sham" exception to
the per se rule. 87 Although the majority did not share Justice Powell's
views, courts in subsequent cases have used Justice Powell's Hishon
concurrence to justify both decisions to deny partners the right to
invoke the federal employment discrimination statutes,8 8 and deci-
sions to permit partners to bring such actions.89
Courts also have applied the per se rule to disputes arising under
the ADEA. In Holland v. Ernst & Whinney,9° the plaintiff attempted
to bring an ADEA action in federal district court against a partner-
ship in which he had been a partner for eleven years prior to his dis-
missal for allegedly discriminatory reasons. 9' The district court
rejected the plaintiff's contention that the Supreme Court's decision
80. Id. at 78.
81. Id. n.10.
82. Id. at 74 n.4.
83. 678 F.2d at 1026.
84. Hishon, 467 U.S. at 79 (Powell, J., concurring).
85. Id.
86. Id. n.2.
87. See infra notes 101-02 & 201 and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 96-102.
89. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 132-55.
90. 35 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 34,653 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 17, 1984).
91. Id. Although the court never discussed it, the fact that the plaintiff in Holland had
been a partner at the defendant partnership for eleven years may have been a compelling factor
in the court's decision.
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in Hishon made the ADEA applicable to his dismissal.92 The district
court stated that the plaintiff's role as partner in the defendant part-
nership did not constitute employment, and that because the "ADEA
applies only to discrimination in the context of employment, [the
ADEA] has no application in the context of [the] case."' 93 The court
dismissed the plaintiff's ADEA action for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted, but in so doing, the court failed to
cite any cases to support its holding.94 Thus it would appear that the
district court, like the Seventh Circuit in the Burke and Dowd deci-
sions and the Eleventh Circuit in Hishon, refused to accept the view
that a partner could be considered an employee under legislation such
as the ADEA. 9
In Maher v. Price Waterhouse,96 another case in which a court
ruled that partners cannot be considered employees under the ADEA,
the plaintiff, a former partner of an accounting firm, brought an
ADEA action against the defendant partnership contending that the
partnership violated the ADEA by forcing him to retire when he
reached the age of sixty years old.97 The district court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment, relying principally on the
Seventh Circuit's Burke and Dowd decisions,9" and on Justice Pow-
ell's concurring opinion in Hishon.99 After holding that partners of
an accounting firm are not employees under the ADEA, the court
proceeded to determine whether the plaintiff was truly a partner
rather than an employee. 00 The Maher court, in its analysis, focused
primarily on sham relationships, in which persons are merely labeled
partners to evade the proscriptions of the employment discrimination
laws. After considering all the relevant facts in the case, the court
found that the "[p]laintiff clearly was not simply labeled a 'partner' to
avoid the scope of the ADEA."''° Thus, following Justice Powell's
92. Id.
93. Id. One district court has expressly refused to follow Holland. See Caruso v. Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 664 F. Supp. 144, 147 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
94. Holland, 35 Empl. Prac. Dec. at 34,653.
95. Id.
96. No. 84-1522C(2) (E.D. Mo. Apr. 8, 1985).
97. Id.
98. Id. For a discussion of these cases, see supra text accompanying notes 47-62.
99. Maher, No. 84-1522C(2) (E.D. Mo. Apr. 8, 1985). For a discussion of Justice Powell's
concurring opinion, see supra text accompanying notes 84-89.
100. No. 84-1522C(2) (E.D. Mo. Apr. 8, 1985). The court heeded Justice Powell's warning
that employers cannot evade the scope of federal employment discrimination legislation by
labeling employees as partners. Id.
101. Id. The fact that the plaintiff had signed a partnership agreement was determinative in
the court's view. The court stated:
Under the Price Waterhouse Partnership Agreement new partners are admitted
to the partnership by a two-thirds vote ... and can be expelled only by three-
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Hishon concurrence, the Maher court ruled that the only exception to
the per se rule that partners cannot qualify as employees, involves
sham relationships.'0
2
B. The Traditional Partnership Indicia Test
Not all courts follow the per se rule that partners cannot be
employees for purposes of the federal employment discrimination
statutes. Rather, in determining whether a particular individual is an
employee, some courts will analyze certain traditional partnership
attributes that often are considered crucial to the existence of a bona
fide partnership. If any of these attributes is lacking to a significant
degree, a partner may qualify as an employee. The traditional part-
nership indicia test is highly fact sensitive, and requires courts to bal-
ance various factors and view the totality of the purported
relationship. Under the traditional partnership indicia test, partners
may qualify as employees in the context of Title VII, the ADEA, and
the Equal Pay Act, even if no sham situation is involved.° 3 The fol-
lowing cases demonstrate the application of the traditional partner-
ship indicia test.
In Wheeler v Hurdman,'°4 the Tenth Circuit addressed the ques-
tion of whether Marilyn Wheeler, a general partner of Main
Hurdman, an accounting firm organized as a general partnership,
could sue the partnership for discrimination claims under the federal
employment discrimination statutes.0 5 Wheeler brought an action in
federal district court under Title VII, the ADEA, and the Equal Pay
Act against the firm, alleging discrimination against her in compensa-
tion and work assignments. 10 6 She also alleged that the firm dis-
missed her because of her age, or in the alternative, because of her
fourths vote of the partners .. . The Partnership Agreement further specifies
that "[i]n all matters relating to the practice of the partnership the decision of the
majority of the partners shall be conclusive .... " Although the partnership is
managed by a policy board, and a chairman and senior partner, the partners may
by vote remove such persons at any time.
Id. This determination precluded any further analysis of whether the totality of the relation-
ship demonstrated that the plaintiff was in reality an employee. Such emphasis on the partner-
ship agreement is misplaced because it places form over substance.
102. Id.
103. This test goes beyond the sham situation that Justice Powell addressed in his Hishon
concurrence, which allows employers to circumvent the employment discrimination laws by
providing partner status to certain individuals. See supra text accompanying notes 84-89.
104. 825 F.2d 257 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 503 (1987).
105. Id. at 258.
106. Id. After working for the defendant general partnership as a certified public
accountant for nine years, the plaintiff attained partner status. Id. Seventeen months after her
promotion, however, at age forty-seven, the plaintiff was dismissed. Id.
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sex.'° 7 Main Hurdman moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to
state a cause of action; it contended that Wheeler, as a partner of the
firm, was not an employee under federal law.' °8 The district court
denied the motion, and applying an "economic realities" test, held
that the plaintiff was an employee despite her partner status.109
Wheeler and the EEOC, which filed an amicus curiae brief, con-
ceded that she was a bona fide general partner of Main Hurdman
under state partnership law;110 no party to the suit alleged that the
pirtnership labeled Wheeler as a "partner" to evade the strictures of
Title VII, the ADEA, or the Equal Pay Act.' Wheeler contended,
however, that her status at the firm was, in economic reality, both
that of an employee and partner in light of the particular facts of the
case. 12 After attaining partner status, for instance, Wheeler claimed
that her work changed very little:
She had the same client load, same duties and responsibilities, same
support staff, and was supervised in her work and work assign-
ments, by the same department head. A personnel file was main-
tained with respect to her and all other personnel, including
partners. The amounts charged for her services were established
by managing partners. The number of partnership points allocated




110. Id. at 261. The court permitted the EEOC to file an amicus curiae brief and to argue
the case orally. Id. at 258 n.2.
111. Id. at 261. After being elected to the partnership, the plaintiff executed the defendant's
partnership agreement, which provided the following:
[A] change in compensation from salary to a share of the Firm's profits, paid by
draw and an allocation of profits based on points; a contribution to capital;
establishment of a capital account; unlimited personal liability for the debts and
obligations of the partnership; rights under the partnership agreement to vote on
such matters as amendments of the partnership agreement, approval of mergers
with other accounting firms of a certain size, admission of new partners,
termination of a partner's interest, approval of draws, shares of net profits,
special distributions, and any other income to be allocated to any partners, and
dissolution of the firm. In addition, Wheeler became eligible for certain rights
and privileges which were enjoyed only by partners of the firm, such as the right
to sign audit reports and tax returns and the right to be reimbursed for
membership dues in certain clubs; and, she was subject to involuntary
termination of her interest in the partnership only by either: (1) a unanimous
vote of the firm's policy board, or (2) an affirmative vote of no less than 75% of
the members of the firm's advisory board, or (3) an affirmative vote of no less
than 75% of all partners casting votes. Furthermore, by becoming a partner
Wheeler surrendered certain employee benefits including prepaid health
insurance and life insurance.
Id. at 260-61.
112. Id. at 261.
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by the managing partner of her office. Also as a practical matter, a
recommendation by the same managing partner that she or any
other partner of that office be expelled from the partnership was
the final word, since such recommendations, according to Wheeler,
were routinely adopted and appeals of such decisions pursuant to
terms of the partnership agreement were unavailing. 3
Furthermore, Wheeler argued that Main Hurdman's organizational
structure and management style were similar to that of a corporation.
This structure included a managing partner and a policy board with
primary responsibility for the management and control of the
partnership. '
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis by acknowledging that the
federal employment discrimination statutes are fundamentally reme-
dial in nature.' The court recognized that these statutes must be
liberally construed to effectuate their purposes, but cautioned against
judicial legislation, stating that "[1]egislative ends are circumscribed
by statutory means."'"l 6 Despite such liberal construction, the court
observed a general reluctance among courts to expand the definition
of "employee" to include general partners under Title VII, the
ADEA, and the Equal Pay Act.' Both Wheeler and the EEOC
endeavored to persuade the court to adopt the economic realities test
to determine whether individuals are partners or employees on a case-
by-case basis." 8 Such a test requires an analysis of whether the firm
so controls an individual that, in reality, the individual is an employee
113. Id.
114. Id. at 261-62. The plaintiff contended that "although each partner is entitled to vote at
annual or special meetings, the votes are primarily for the purpose of ratifying decisions made
by the managing partner, policy board, or 'nominating' committee." Id. The plaintiff in
Hishon also used this argument. See supra text accompanying note 65.
115. Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 262.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 263-65 (citing Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., 794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir.
1986); EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1984); Hishon v. King &
Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022 (1 1th Cir. 1982); Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977);
Maher v. Price Waterhouse, No. 84-1522C(2) (E.D. Mo. Apr. 8, 1985); Holland v. Ernst &
Whinney, 35 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) T 34,653 (Aug. 17, 1984)). The court particularly noted
Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Hishon, but it stated that "[t]he significance of Justice
Powell's observation must, of course, be tempered by the fact that no other justice joined the
concurring opinion, and by allusions to a highly interactive partnership characterized by
common agreement or consent among the partners." Id. at 265.
The court found little guidance from agency constructions of the employment
discrimination statutes. Id. at 265-67. Because the EEOC historically has not adopted the
economic realities test as the proper standard for determining employee status, the court gave
little weight to the EEOC's position in Wheeler that called for the application of the test to the
defendant partnership.
118. Id. at 268.
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and is therefore subject to an increased risk of discrimination. 19
Although it rejected Main Hurdman's contention that "an economic
realities test is categorically inapplicable to partnerships,"' 20 the
Tenth Circuit found that the economic realities tests that Wheeler and
the EEOC advocated were inappropriate to apply to partnerships.' 2'
In reaching this conclusion, the court took issue with two aspects of
the proposed economic realities test. First, the economic realities test
originated in cases in which courts attempted to determine whether
an individual was an employee or an independent contractor. The
Tenth Circuit reviewed the independent contractor-employee factors
that courts consider under the economic realities test and the hybrid
test, but found them to be of no assistance in the general partnership
context because of the inherent differences between the relationship
among partners and the relationship between employers and
independent contractors. 22 Second, the court found the economic
realities test to be without reasonable limits because underlying this
test is a theory "that any individual who is organizationally or eco-
nomically dominated is an employee."' 123 Such a theory, the court
argued, would require the adoption of a series of unrealistic
presumptions:
[T]here is an underlying assumption by [the proponents of the eco-
nomic realities test] that a "true" general partnership operates like
a New England town meeting; that "true" general partners are not
employees because they personally control management of the
business and their own affairs within the business; that "true" gen-
eral partners are not "dominated;" they are not controlled; they
enjoy equality of bargaining power. Presumably, a "true" partner
is not only heard at partnership meetings but actually controls the
result as it affects that partner. 124
The court concluded that under the proposed economic realities
test, only sole proprietors and a limited number of dominant partners
would qualify as "true partners."'' 25 The court then focused on the
119. Id. at 268-69. The EEOC and Wheeler advocated different tests for determining
employee coverage. The EEOC proposed the application of the hybrid test, whereas Wheeler
urged the court to apply the economic realities test used in FLSA cases. Id. at 268-71.
120. Id. at 271.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 271-72. Among the factors relating to independent contractor-employee status
that the court determined to be irrelevant to inquiries about partnership relationships are the
following: (1) Whether the employer provides the tools used and the workplace; (2) the time
duration within which the person has worked; (3) payment by time or by the job; and (4) skill
required. Id. at 272.
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economic realities underlying the partnership relationship, and rea-
soned that another difficulty in applying the economic realities test to
partners is the existence of partnership agreements: "[P]artner status
is supported by [an] agreement-written, oral, or implied-and stat-
utes; [and thus] 'domination' of a partner may consist not of an
absence of rights, as with an independent contractor, but of an abdica-
tion of rights, which may or may not be a temporary submissive-
ness." " 26 The court rejected both the proffered control and economic
realities tests, arguing that such tests disregard or inappropriately
reduce the crucial characteristics of partnership status and would be
extremely difficult to apply.' 2' The Tenth Circuit, "[p]ending exami-
nation of the question by Congress,"'' 28 therefore held that bona fide
general partners are not employees.' 29 Nevertheless, the court sug-
gested that a contrary result would be possible if "[tihe bundle of
partnership characteristics [the court] identified [were] lacking in
important particulars, or there [were] some deception which compro-
mise[d] the actuality of those characteristics."' 3 °
In Caruso v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.,1 3 ' the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York rejected any
"per se rule that an individual denoted as a 'partner' falls outside the
ADEA definition of employee."' 13 2 The plaintiff in Caruso, a former
partner of a major national accounting and consulting partnership,
brought an age discrimination action against Peat, Marwick under the
ADEA. 133 Peat, Marwick moved to dismiss the suit on the ground
that Caruso's status as a partner precluded him from being considered
an employee. ' 3
4
After Peat, Marwick promoted Caruso to partner in 1980, his
responsibilities remained relatively unchanged.' 35 Although the part-
126. Id. at 274.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 277.
129. Id.
130. Id. Such characteristics include "participation in profits and losses, exposure to
liability, investment in the firm, partial ownership of firm assets, . . . voting rights, [and the
economic and legal significance of being a partner] under the partnership agreement and
partnership laws." Id. at 276.
131. 664 F. Supp. 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
132. Id. at 147.
133. Id. at 146. A twenty-one member board of directors governed the defendant firm and
nominated employees for partner status. A six-tier management hierarchy, including a chief
executive officer, who reported directly to the board, and partners in charge, who made routine
administrative decisions at each of the defendant's many offices, carried out the policy
decisions of the board of directors. The plaintiff worked at the defendant's New York office,
which employed 128 partners, 36 of whom held management positions. Id. at 145.
134. Id.
135. Id. The plaintiff in Wheeler also alleged that her promotion to partner by the
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nership gave Caruso discretionary power to make decisions regarding
clients, his recommendations were subject to ratification or rejection
by a member of Peat, Marwick's management.3 6 The Peat, Marwick
partners did not hold any ownership interest; rather, they "receive[d]
a base salary of about $25,000, with additional compensation derived
from firm profits and determined by the number of 'units' assigned to
each partner." '37 The court acknowledged that central corporate
decisionmakers, or controlling owners, are not employees under the
ADEA,1 38 but it further stated that an employee would not be denied
coverage under the act solely because his job description is "impres-
sive." 139 In addition, the court determined that a per se rule that the
ADEA cannot apply to individuals employed under the title of part-
ner is inconsistent 4 ° with Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., '4'
and EEOC v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 142
defendant partnership had a negligible effect on her duties. See supra note 113 and
accompanying text.
136. Caruso, 664 F. Supp. at 145.
137. Id. at 146.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 147.
141. 794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1986). In Hyland, the plaintiff, a one-fifth shareholder of the
defendant professional corporation, brought an ADEA action against the defendant
contending that he was unlawfully forced to resign as an employee, officer, and director on the
basis of his age. Id. at 794. The district court applied an "economic realites" test and granted
the defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that the plaintiff was truly a partner
and not an employee, because in reality the defendant functioned as a partnership. Id. at 794-
95. On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the lower court's judgment and held that if an
entity operates under the corporate form of organization, there is no need to inquire whether
that entity is, in essence, a partnership. Id. at 798 ("While those who own shares in a
corporation may or may not be employees, they cannot under any circumstances be partners in
the same enterprise because the roles are mutually exclusive."). The Second Circuit's position
regarding whether partners can be employees under the federal employment discrimination
legislation is not clear. In the Hyland decision, the court pointed out that individuals properly
classified as partners generally are not employees under such statutes. Id. at 797. The Hyland
court cited both Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977), and Justice Powell's
concurrence in Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984), for the proposition that "[i]t is
by reason of their unique status as business owners and managers that true partners cannot be
classified as employees." Hyland, 794 F.2d at 797. The court, however, also noted the
EEOC's standard for distinguishing partners from employees, suggesting, at least, that it may
be appropriate to apply an economic realities test or a partnership indicia test to determine
whether an individual is an employee, individual contractor, or partner. Id.
142. 775 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1046 (1986). In EEOC v. Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., the EEOC brought an action in federal court to enforce a subpoena
issued to the defendant partnership. 775 F.2d at 929. The subpoenaed documents pertained to
the partners' relationship to the company and to each other, "and documents relating to [Peat,
Marwick's] retirement practices and policies." Id. On appeal, the defendant partnership
contended that the subpoena should not be enforced because Congress did not authorize the
EEOC's investigation. Id. at 929. According to the defendant partnership, its partners were
employers under the ADEA. Id. at 929-30. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's
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Moreover, the district court in Caruso reasoned that Justice
Powell's often quoted Hishon concurrence supported the rejection of a
per se rule exempting partners from the ADEA's employee cover-
age.' 4 3 The court argued that Justice Powell's concurrence under-
scores the inherent weakness of the per se rule. Under the per se rule
urged by the defendant in Caruso, for example, employers could effec-
tively deprive their employees of their rights under the ADEA by
merely calling them "partners."'" In addition, the court noted that
the per se rule would prohibit "physicians, accountants, attorneys,
and other professionals whose employers traditionally have organized
their businesses as partnerships" from invoking the protections of the
ADEA. 14
5
Peat, Marwick also argued that judicial interference in the part-
nership selection process violated "the first amendment freedom of
association rights of partnership members."' 46  In response, the
district court noted that "[t]he Supreme Court has rejected this con-
tention, [stating] that '[i]nvidious private discrimination may be char-
acterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by
the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative con-
stitutional protections.' "147
The Caruso court did not conclude that all "bona fide" or "true"
partners were employees under the ADEA,' 48 but it did toughen the
standards by which courts should determine bona fide partner status.
The court defined a bona fide partner as a policy decisionmaker whose
work responsibilities are not controlled by any one member of the
firm. '4  According to the Caruso court, a true partner not only
receives a percentage of the firm's profits as compensation, but also
remains a permanent member of the partnership except under excep-
order to enforce the subpoena. Id. at 931: It held that the EEOC's investigation "to determine
whether individuals that [Peat, Marwick] classifies as 'partners' fall within the definition of
'employees' for purposes of the ADEA" was for a legitimate purpose authorized by Congress.
Id. at 930. The court acknowledged the EEOC's position that job titles are not controlling in
determining whether a person is an employee under the ADEA. Id.
143. Caruso, 664 F. Supp. at 147-48.
144. Id. Of course, these "partners" would not be given the decisionmaking authority or
job security traditionally associated with partnership status.
145. Id. at 148.
146. Id. n.5. According to Professor Mechem, the "right to choose one's own partner-the
delectus personarum, as it- is often called-is properly regarded as one of the most important
characteristics of partnership." F. MECHEM, supra note 6, at 7.
147. Id. See Hishon, 467 U.S. at 78 (1984) (quoting Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455,
470 (1973)).
148. 664 F. Supp. at 148. The Caruso court acknowledged that central corporate
decisionmakers and owners do not qualify as employees.
149. Id. at 149.
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tional circumstances. 5 ° The court listed three factors to consider
when determining an individual's status as an employee or partner
under the ADEA: "(1) The extent of the individual's ability to con-
trol and operate his business; (2) [t]he extent to which an individual's
compensation is calculated as a percentage of business profits; and
(3) [t]he extent of the individual's employment security."'' After
applying this three-part test to the particular facts of Caruso, the dis-
trict court held that the plaintiff qualified as an employee despite his
partner title, and thus could bring an ADEA action. 15 2
IV. COMMENT
A. The Proper Test for Determining Employee Status: The
Economic Realities Test
The most appropriate test for determining employee status under
the federal employment discrimination statutes is the economic reali-
ties test that the Supreme Court enunciated in NLRB v. Hearst Publi-
cations, Inc.'5 3 Under this test, courts must construe the term
"employee" in light of the goals of the statutes and the realities under-
lying the economic relationship between the employer and the alleged
employee. Courts must extend protection if the circumstances of the
work relationship demonstrate that protection is required. I 4 Because
an employer can control employment opportunities by virtue of his
power to define employment terms and conditions and his influence in
the employment market, the economic realities test focuses on
"whether the employer's control of employment opportunities places
the worker in a position of dependency on the employer which may
expose the worker to discriminatory conduct."' 55 The tremendous
flexibility of this test allows courts to consider numerous factors in
deciding whether the requisite employment relationship is present.
These factors might include, among others, the organization and
character of the employer's business; the employer's hiring, promo-
tion, and termination practices; performance and reward criteria; the
worker's ability to hire other workers; and the bargaining power of
the worker vis-a-vis the employer. 5 6 Furthermore, the statutory
scheme, purpose, and legislative history of the federal employment
150. Id.
151. Id. at 149-50.
152. Id. at 150.
153. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
154. Id. at 129.
155. Dowd, The Test of Employee Status. Economic Realities and Title VII, 26 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 75, 113 (1984).
156. Id. at 113-14.
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discrimination statutes support the adoption of the economic realities
test. 15
7
Equality of employment opportunity is the major objective of
Title VII, the ADEA, and the Equal Pay Act. 158 Opportunity for
employment is crucial not only because it provides the occasion to
improve one's economic and social status, but also because it reduces
the extent to which people depend on government assistance.15 9 Soci-
ety, therefore, has a tremendous interest in ensuring that artificial bar-
riers to employment do not disadvantage individuals competing in the
workplace. Through the federal employment discrimination statutes,
Congress has determined that arbitrary factors such as age, race,
color, religion, gender, or national origin, should not limit an individ-
ual's employment opportunities. 6 ° A significant advantage of apply-
ing the economic realities test is that the test is closely attuned to the
prophylactic goals that underlie the federal statutes. Under this test,
courts must broadly construe the statutory provisions to eliminate the
evil at which the statutes were directed. This approach ensures that
the wide spectrum of persons who rely on others for their livelihood
may obtain the protections afforded to employees under the statutes if
they are ever subjected to employment decisions that are based on
illegitimate considerations.
Congress deliberately drafted a broad definition of the word
''employee" in the federal employment discrimination statutes,
thereby demonstrating that "[tihe word 'is not treated by Congress as
a word of art having a definite meaning.' "61 Instead, the term
"employee" takes its meaning from ". 'its surroundings [in) the statute
where it appears.'"162 Because the economic realities test requires
courts to construe the meaning of the term "employee" in light of the
evil to be eradicated, the meaning of the word is derived from the
federal employment discrimination laws themselves.
It is unclear from the legislative history of the federal statutes
157. See infra notes 165-70 and accompanying text.
158. See infra note 201.
159. See A. PINKNEY, THE MYTH OF BLACK PROGRESS 96-97 (1984). Alphonso Pinkney
has argued:
[D]iscrimination is the most salient factor in black unemployment ....
In addition to the economic burdens of unemployment on blacks, they are
affected in other ways. One of these is the loss of self-esteem. It makes it difficult
for the husband to support his family, and frequently he takes the easiest way out
by leaving the family to be supported by public assistance.
Id.
160. See supra notes 14, 16 & 21 and accompanying text.
161. Hearst, 322 U.S. at 124 (quoting United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S.
534, 545 n.29 (1940)).
162. Id.
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who may qualify as an employee. 163  One can make a strong argu-
ment, however, that the expansive interpretation of the term
"employee" under the economic realities test comports with Con-
gress' intent in enacting Title VII, the ADEA, and the Equal Pay
Act.164 Congress easily could have included a more restrictive defini-
tion, but it did not do so because such a definition would have
impaired the broad purpose of the statutes. Congress, for example,
modeled Title VII after the NLRA.' 65  After the Supreme Court
applied the economic realities test in a case arising under the NLRA,
Congress specifically amended the NLRA to provide a more restric-
tive common law right-to-control test for determining employee sta-
tus. Although "[t]his amendment was on the books before Title VII
was formulated ... Congress incorporated no similar provisions into
Title VI.' 1 66 Congress' silence should thus be interpreted as a tacit
163. In defending an amendment to restrict the application of Title VII to businesses with
100 or more employees, Senator Cotton asserted that "when a small businessman who employs
30 or 25 or 26 persons selects an employee, he comes very close to selecting a partner; and
when a businessman selects a partner, he comes dangerously close to the situation he faces
when he selects a wife." 110 CONG. REC. 13,085 (1964). The Supreme Court of the United
States, however, noted that "[b]ecause Senator Cotton's amendment failed, it is unclear to
what extent Congress shared his concerns about selecting partners." Hishon, 467 U.S. at 77-78
n.10. Senator Hugo Black, during the Senate debates on the Fair Labor Standards Act, took
the position that the drafters of the Act gave "employee" its most expansive definition. 81
CONG. REC. 7,656-57 (daily ed. July 27, 1937). According to the Eleventh Circuit in Cobb v.
Sun Papers, Inc., courts are reluctant to apply the economic realities test in Title VII cases
because "there is no statement in the Act or legislative history of Title VII comparable to [the]
one made by Senator Hugo Black." 673 F.2d 337, 340 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 874
(1982). In addition, during the Senate debate on Title VII, Senator Joseph Clark specified that
"[t]he term 'employer' [was] intended to have its common dictionary meaning, except as
expressly qualified by the act." 110 CONG. REC. 7,216 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 1964). See Hishon,
678 F.2d at 1027 n.9 (appellee contended that "the term [employee] should be given its
common dictionary meaning as suggested by Senator Clark in reference to the term
employer"). These pieces of legislative history, however, do not help to determine whether a
partner should be considered an employee, because "nothing in the legislative history of these
Acts explicitly addresses the definition of employee." Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 263. As a result,
courts are divided as to the proper test for determining employee status. The Eleventh Circuit,
for example, reasoned that Congress intended the term "employee" to be interpreted according
to general common law principles. Cobb, 673 F.2d at 340-41. One district court also adopted
this view in Smith v. Dutra Trucking Co., 410 F. Supp. 513, 516 (N.D. Cal. 1976), aff'd, 580
F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1978). But cf Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1339-41 (6th Cir.
1983) (attempting to demonstrate how the legislative history supports the adoption of the
economic realities test to determine employee status under Title VII).
164. See Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1977); Dowd, supra note
155, at 89-95.
165. Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1341.
166. Id. ("[In that Congress was specifically aware of the judicial construction accorded
the term 'employee' absent an explicit limitation, we now refuse to imply such a restriction into
the otherwise broad terms of Title VII."). For the approach courts should follow when
interpreting the term "employee" under the ADEA and the FLSA, from which the Equal Pay
Act emanated, see Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978) (stating that if "Congress adopts
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approval of those Title VII decisions in which courts applied the eco-
nomic realities test.
B. A Partner as an "Employee" Under the Economic Realities Test
A partner may, under some circumstances, be considered an
employee under Title VII, the ADEA, or the Equal Pay Act despite
his partner status. Under the economic realities test, an employee is
an individual who may be exposed to discriminatory conduct because
of his economic dependence on the employer, measured by the
employer's control of the worker's employment opportunities. A
partner therefore may qualify as an employee if the economic realities
of the employment relationship so dictate. The legal relationship
involved in a particular case is not of itself determinative of employee
status: An employer should not be allowed to circumvent the
employment discrimination laws merely because the employer has
chosen the partnership form of business organization.
The fact that a partner may be an employee is not inconsistent
with the provisions of the UPA. Although the UPA seems to embody
egalitarian principles, 167 partnerships may have strong nonegalitarian
characteristics. Contrary agreements among partners will override
many of the UPA's significant governance provisions. Under the
UPA, for example, partners have equal rights in the management and
conduct of the affairs of the partnership. 168 Partners, however, may
expressly or impliedly agree that one or more of them shall have
exclusive control over the management of partnership business.169 In
fact, partners can include almost any provision in their partnership
agreement-they may even authorize self-dealing.170 The tremendous
a new law incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress normally can be presumed to have
had knowledge of the interpretation given to the incorporated law; at least insofar as it affects
the new statute."); Dunlop v. Carriage Carpet Co., 548 F.2d 139, 142 (6th Cir. 1977) (In
construing the term "employee" under the FLSA, the court stated that it was "guided by
decisions defining the boundaries of 'employee' as that term is used in the Social Security Act,
the National Labor Relations Act, and in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.").
167. See supra note 25.
168. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT, § 18(e), 6 U.L.A. 213 (1969).
169. Id. § 18 ("The rights and duties of the partners in relation to the partnership shall be
determined, subject to any agreement between them."); see also Parks v. Riverside Ins. Co. of
Am., 308 F.2d 175, 180 (10th Cir. 1962) (stating that it is permissible for partners to agree that
"as among themselves, one or more of them shall have exclusive control over the management
of the partnership business, and that an agreement for exclusive control of the management of
the business by one partner may be implied from the course of conduct of the parties.").
170. Riviera Congress Assocs. v. Yassky, 18 N.Y.2d 540, 548, 223 N.E.2d 876, 880, 277
N.Y.S.2d 386, 392 (1966) ("[P]artners may include in the partnership articles practically 'any
agreement they wish' and, if the asserted self-dealing was actually contemplated and
authorized, it would not, ipso facto, be impermissible and deemed wrongful.") (citations
omitted).
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deference to partnership agreements under the UPA permits
employer-employee relationships to exist among bona fide partners.
In one case, for example, a junior partner who contributed his services
to the partnership and received a salary, but was prohibited from con-
tributing any assets or property, and was not entitled to a share in the
profits, and played only a nominal role in the management of the part-
nership, was deemed to be a true partner under the partnership
agreement. I I
Although it is true that entry into a partnership relationship is
voluntary, a partnership agreement, whether written, oral, or implied,
should not deprive an individual of the rights that are provided under
Title VII, the ADEA, and the Equal Pay Act. As the following sce-
nario demonstrates, a partner may have little choice regarding the
terms and conditions of the partnership agreement:
Consider the plight of the large law firm's associate who labors
five, seven, nine, or more years in the quest to become a partner.
During this period, she knows little about the partnership or the
income of partners. She is quite sure, however, that "partner" is a
status worthy of pursuit. When the day of her reward arrives and
she is invited to be a partner, the associate is presented with a copy
of the partnership agreement, which obviously will provide a struc-
ture for the partnership quite different from that offered by the
U.P.A.'s default provisions. This event is perfunctory; bargaining
opportunities are nonexistent; the definitive agreement is an
imposed agreement. Although the associate may have reservations
concerning the agreement, she has only two choices: (1) she can
sign it anyway; or (2) she can find another job. Inevitably, she will
sign. 172
Despite the newly admitted partner's increased employment security,
income, and status, she actually remains an employee, at least until
she acquires a greater degree of power and status in the
partnership. 173
The legal profession is the paradigmatic context for partner invo-
cation of the federal employment discrimination statutes. Law firms
traditionally have operated as partnerships,'74 and their hiring -and
employment customs historically have resulted in widespread dis-
171. Provident Trust Co. v. Rankin, 333 Pa. 412, 5 A.2d 214 (1939).
172. Hillman, supra note 12, at 441-42.
173. Id. at 442 n.61 (positing that -[b]argaining among partners in the firm may indeed
occur, but it is typically a post-admission phenomenon reflective of existing partners' attempts
to reallocate income based upon perceptions of their values to the firm").
174. Caruso, 664 F. Supp. at 148; see also Comment, Civil Rights: Law Partners as
Employees for Title VII Purposes?, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 201, 202 n.10 (1983).
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crimination. 75 Many large law firms are organized with a hierarchi-
cal structure that clearly delineates between senior and junior
partners: 76
Senior partners direct the work of the firm, determine the profit
percentages paid each partner, and control firm policy. On the
other hand, the junior partner in many firms is practically indistin-
guishable from the senior associates. Whatever his label, he is still
an employee who has his time and work closely supervised and
does not share in policy matters. In many firms the junior partners
do not share on a percentage basis in the firm profits; nor do they
have a vote at firm meetings. 177
These lower level partners are not only at a bargaining disadvantage
vis-a-vis partners in the upper echelon of the partnership, but also
their employment opportunities may be limited as a result of discrimi-
natory attitudes or decisions by those at the top of the hierarchy.
Under the economic realities test, partners in such nonegalitarian
firms could invoke the protections of Title VII, the ADEA, or the
Equal Pay Act if they had been victimized by discriminatory employ-
ment practices.
The negligible number of women and minorities who have
attained and maintained partner status in the country's largest law
firms indicates that partners should indeed be protected under federal
law if the economic realities so dictate. In a recent survey of over two
hundred of the largest law firms in the United States, less than ten
percent of the partners in these firms were women and minorities. 7 8
Granting a partner the right to claim the protection of federal law in
cases in which his relationship to the partnership provides the oppor-
tunity for employment discrimination is consistent with the broad
remedial nature of the statutes. In addition, the application of Title
VII, the ADEA, and the Equal Pay Act to partnerships does not vio-
late any constitutional right of privacy or association.' 79 Neverthe-
175. Paone & Reis, Effective Enforcement of Federal Nondiscrimination Provisions in the
Hiring of Lawyers, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 615, 615 (1967). The authors noted that "entrance into
the upper echelons of the metropolitan legal profession is based as much upon ethnic and
religious background as upon talent, education, and personality." Id. at 616.
176. Id. at 639; see also Hillman, supra note 12, at 441 (stating that "[o]ne of the better
examples of hierarchical partnerships is found in large partnerships of professionals such as
corporate law firms").
177. Paone & Reis, supra note 175, at 639.
178. Weisenhaus, White Males Dominate Firms. Still a Long Way to Go for Women,
Minorities, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 8, 1988, at 1, col. 2.
179. The Supreme Court of the United States, in Hishon v. King & Spalding, rejected the
argument that the constitutional rights of freedom of expression and association preclude the
application of Title VII to partnership decisions not to consider an individual for promotion to
partner status. 467 U.S. at 78. In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated:
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less, many courts continue to apply employee coverage tests under
which partners are not considered employees.
C. The Rejection of the Per Se Rule
The majority of courts that have addressed whether a partner
can qualify as an employee suscribe to a per se rule that a partner
cannot be considered an employee.'8 0 In deciding whether a particu-
lar individual is a partner or an employee under Title VII, the ADEA,
or the Equal Pay Act, these courts have largely ignored the employ-
ment relationships to which these statutes were specifically directed.
In Burke v. Friedman,'8 ' for example, the Seventh Circuit "[did] not
see how partners [could] be regarded as employees," because the
court perceived partners as employers who "manage and control the
business and share in the profits and losses." 8" This view of partner-
ship reflects the traditional concept of partnership status, '83 but mini-
mizes the realities of the employment relationship. Moreover, the
Burke decision is inconsistent in one respect: Although the court
noted that the determination of whether an individual is an employee
under Title VII depends on the facts of each case, it did not pursue
any aggresive inquiry into the relationship among the partners to
Although we have recognized that the activities of lawyers may make a
"distinctive contribution ... to the ideas and beliefs of our society," respondent
has not shown how its ability to fulfill such a function would be inhibited by a
requirement that it consider petitioner for partnership on her merits. Moreover,
as we have held in another context, "[i]nvidious private discrimination may be
characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the
First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional
protections." There is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the
selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union.
Id. (quoting Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
431 (1963)). Another court also found that applying Title VII to a law firm's partnership
promotion decision did not violate the members' first amendment rights of privacy or freedom
of association. Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
("[T]he court does not recognize any First Amendment privacy or associational rights for a
commercial, profit-making business organization of the nature of the Cravath partnership.
Cases recognizing such First Amendment rights refer to fraternal or social organizations not
business organizations.") (citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Bellis v. United
States, 417 U.S. 85, 92-95, 100-01 (1974); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-86
(1965)); see also Bartholet, supra note 9, at 983-84 (contending that the argument that applying
the federal employment discrimination laws to partnerships unconstitutionally infringes on
associational rights of partners "is no more powerful at the upper level than at the lower" job
levels.).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 47-79 & 90-102.
181. 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977).
182. Id. at 869.
183. The UPA's definition of partnership coincides with this traditional view. See supra text
accompanying note 24.
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determine whether persons labeled "partners" were truly partners. 184
The selection of the partnership form of organization seemed to have
precluded the existence of an employment relationship among the
partners. Nevertheless, "despite Burke, the realities of at least many
large firm partnerships require them to be considered 'employment'
situations, at least for all except a few 'senior' partners."' 185
The problems with the per se rule adopted in Burke are readily
apparent. Under this rule, partners could circumvent the proscrip-
tions of Title VII, the ADEA, and the Equal Pay Act by promoting 0
their associates to partnership status, only to terminate their "employ-
ment" thereafter in violation of the federal statutes. The major weak-
ness of the per se rule is that it does not adequately take into account
the prophylactic goals of the employment discrimination statutes, nor
the economic realities underlying the work relationship among part-
ners. 186 Furthermore, the analyses of the courts that have adopted
the per se rule have been incomplete, and in some cases, not entirely
rational. 18
7
184. Burke, 556 F.2d at 869-70.
185. C. SULLIVAN, supra note 4, at 96.
186. In finding partners to be clearly distinguishable from employees, the Eleventh Circuit
in Hishon, for example, reasoned that the partners in that case were not employees because the
defendant partnership operated as a partnership under applicable state law. 678 F.2d at 1028.
But the fact that an organization functions as a partnership under state law does not
necessarily preclude a partner from being an employee under the federal employment
discrimination statutes. See Lucido, 425 F. Supp. at 129 n.6 ("If the N.Y. Partnership Law
§ 40(7) is inconsistent with the application of Title VII in this case, Title VII, which expressly
preempts state law contrary to it, controls.") (citation omitted). It appears that under Hishon,
once it is determined that a partnership exists, the analysis need not proceed further because
from the court's perspective, partners cannot be employees; this approach focuses on whether a
partnership exists, and it largely ignores the realities underlying the work relationship between
and among the partners. Thus, the presence of proscribed discriminatory conduct is
inconsequential. This may be correct in other contexts, but with respect to the federal
employment discrimination laws, the organizational form under which a business operates is
merely a factor to consider in determining employee coverage. Title VII, the ADEA, and the
Equal Pay Act deal primarily with employment relationships. Under the UPA, however,
partners may enter into agreements whereby certain members of the partnership are in reality
employees. An example of this situation occurs in some large hierarchical law firms where
junior partners are no different from senior associates, except in job description. Under the
Eleventh Circuit's Hishon analysis, partnerships could terminate such "partners" in seeming
violation of Title VII, the ADEA, or the Equal Pay Act, and those partners would have no
legal basis to challenge such decisions. Such an approach would render the application of the
employment discrimination statutes wholly ineffective in protecting individuals who are for all
practical purposes employees, and therefore, exposed to prohibited discriminatory conduct by
those partners in the upper echelon of the partnership.
187. Despite the inherent weaknesses of the per se rule adopted in Burke, the Seventh
Circuit relied upon Burke and refused to equate partners with employees in EEOC v. Dowd &
Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177, 1178 (7th Cir. 1984). In Maher v. Price Waterhouse, the court
also relied upon Burke in holding that partners cannot qualify as employees under the ADEA.
Maher, No. 84-1522C(2) (E.D. Mo. Apr. 8, 1985). In adopting the per se rule, some courts
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The courts adopting the per se rule unjustifiably discard the reali-
ties underlying the work relationship. Consequently, partners who do
not possess the attributes generally associated with partner status are
twice deprived merely because of the partnership label; i.e., they do
not receive the full benefits of partnership, nor are they afforded the
have misconstrued prior decisions, resulting in a results-oriented approach; i.e., an approach
under which the question posed-whether partners may qualify as employees-cannot be
addressed, because these courts start with the premise that partners cannot be employees. In
Dowd, for example, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the Supreme Court's decision in Hishon
v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984), supported the adoption of the per se rule that partners
cannot be employees. Dowd, 736 F.2d at 1178. In its Hishon analysis, the Court presumed
that the defendant partnership constituted an employer under Title VII. Hishon, 467 U.S. at
73-75 & n.3. Because the Supreme Court acknowledged that a partnership can be an employer
under Title VII, the Dowd court reasoned that a partner cannot therefore be an employee.
Dowd, 736 F.2d at 1178. This analysis is lacking in substance and only begs the question of
whether partners can be employees. The language of Title VII unambiguously supports the
proposition that a partnership can be an employer, because section 701 explicitly provides that
"[t]he term 'employer' means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has
fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in
the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)
(1982). Moreover, section 701 of Title VII provides that "[t]he term 'person' includes one or
more individuals, governments, governmental agencies, political subdivisions, labor unions,
partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, mutual companies, joint-stock
companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees in cases under title 11, or
receivers." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1982) (emphasis added). The definitions of the term "em-
ployer" contained in both the ADEA and the Equal Pay Act also include partnerships. See 29
U.S.C. § 203(a), (d) (1982); 29 U.S.C. § 630(a), (b) (1982). The Dowd court further stated that
Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Hishon suggested that partners cannot be employees.
Dowd, 736 F.2d at 1178. Justice Powell recognized a clear distinction between the relationship
among law partners and the relationship between employers and employees. Hishon, 467 U.S.
at 79 (Powell, J., concurring). But "[t]he significance of Justice Powell's observation must, of
course, be tempered by the fact that no other justice joined the concurring opinion, and by
allusions to a highly interactive partnership characterized by common agreement or consent
among the partners." Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 265. Justice Powell cautioned that employers
cannot merely label some employees partners to circumvent Title VII's proscriptions. Hishon,
467 U.S. at 79 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring). This warning only clouds the issue by skewing the
proper framework for analysis. The correct inquiry should be whether partners can be
employees in light of the legislative history, language, and purpose of the federal employment
discrimination statutes. Justice Powell, however, seems to have shifted the focus of analysis to
the question of what constitutes a true partner. Although a partnership is generally described
as an association of two or more individuals who manage and control a business for profit as
co-owners, there is no bright line rule as to what constitutes a true partner. In addition,
Justice Powell presumed that law firm partnerships generally function as egalitarian
institutions in which the partners interact with each other to a significant extent on issues
concerning the operations of the partnership. Id. at 79-80 & nn.2 & 3 (Powell, J., concurring).
The traditional attributes of partnership that Justice Powell identified, however, may be
lacking significantly with respect to certain partners in partnerships organized under the UPA.
See supra text accompanying notes 167-77. Arguably, from Powell's perspective, these so-
called partners would not be considered partners; yet they could still be bona fide partners
under the UPA. One is left in a quandary as to whether these partners are protected under the
employment discrimination laws. Despite the'Seventh Circuit's understanding of the Supreme
Court's opinion in Hishon, that opinion gives no indication whether partners can be considered
employees.
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protection given to employees. The per se rule, therefore, exalts form
over substance.
D. The Rejection of the Traditional Partnership Indicia Test
The traditional partnership indicia test is not only too cumber-
some, but also lacks a convincing degree of rationality. Courts that
have adopted this test are unnecesssarily preoccupied with determin-
ing what constitutes a bona fide partner. They start with the premise
that bona fide partners cannot be employees and then proceed to
examine whether the individual in question possesses the attributes
that are perceived as being essential to the existence of partner
status. 18a
Because the courts are not in agreement as to what factors estab-
lish partner status and the weight to be accorded to these factors, the
traditional partnership indicia test may produce inconsistent results in
similar factual circumstances. 8 9 The various indicia of partner status
are apparently extrapolated from the old common law of partnership
and from the UPA. The tremendous emphasis that courts have
placed on traditional notions of partnership is, however, unwarranted.
Partnership law has come to a virtual standstill since the major-
ity of states adopted the UPA in its various forms more than sixty
years ago. 190 A major weakness of the traditional indicia test is that it
presumes too much. Because the UPA is technically deficient in
many respects,19' and because the law of partnership has yet to be
examined in light of the circumstances under which modern partner-
ships function, 92 reliance on traditional concepts of partnership sta-
tus is highly questionable.
There is no bright line rule as to what constitutes a bona fide or
true partner. Although a partnership is generally perceived as an
association of two or more individuals who manage and control a
business as co-owners for profit, these attributes may be altered signif-
188. See, e.g., Hyland, 794 F.2d at 801 (Cardamone, J., dissenting) ("When all the indicia of
partnership status are not present, an individual is an employee within the purview of the
ADEA-regardless of the label attached to his position. Such an approach best fulfills the
Act's remedial purposes.").
189. See supra notes 104-52 and accompanying text.
190. Hillman, supra note 12, at 426-31 (identifying possible reasons why partnership law
has assumed both a revered and neglected status). According to Professor Hillman, the
attention given to the partnership form of business organization in academia has been
extremely sparse. Id. at 426-27.
191. Id. at 429. For an example of such a deficiency, "one need only look at the
inconsistent and confusing terminology contained in section 38 of the U.P.A." Id. n.12. For
criticisms of the UPA, see A. BROMBERG, supra note 6, at 103, 246-49, 296-97, 302, 416-17,
468.
192. Hillman, supra note 12, at 429.
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icantly by agreement. In some modern partnerships, the partners
may have signed an agreement under which the bundle of tradition-
ally accepted partnership characteristics may be lacking to a signifi-
cant degree with regard to some of the partners. It is questionable
whether a court that has adopted the traditional partnership indicia
test should disregard the agreement, adhering instead to its own
notions of partnership, which may be greatly at odds with the intent
of the original drafters of the partnership agreement. In light of the
supplementary nature of the UPA regarding partnership agreements,
such an approach seems impermissible. The partnership indicia test,
therefore, is inappropriate for determining employee status. The test,
like the traditional common law test and the per se rule, diminishes
the reach of the federal employment discrimination statutes by
excluding individuals "not on the basis of the realities of their interac-
tion with employers, but rather upon the existence or nonexistence of
a limited set of factors in the formal structure of the employment
relationship."' 1
93
E. The Effect of the Status Quo
The courts' reluctance to allow partners to invoke the federal
employment discrimination statutes is partially a result of their ten-
dency to give more deference to employment decisions made by upper
level rather than lower level employers. 94 This institutional bias,
however, unduly restricts the reach of federal legislation and has no
basis in law or policy.' 95 The courts that have addressed whether
partners can be employees under Title VII, the ADEA, and the Equal
Pay Act have not adopted the proper framework within which to
achieve the objectives of the statutes. Rather than construing the
employment discrimination laws in a manner that addresses the evil
to which the statutes are directed, these courts have pursued formalis-
tic and rigid analyses that focus primarily on the existence of charac-
teristics commonly associated with employment relationships, or on
generally understood attributes of partnership status. These analyses
have for the most part ignored the underlying realities of the work
relationship.
Although the prophylactic goals of the federal laws that pro-
193. Dowd, supra note 155, at 85-86.
194. Bartholet, supra note 9, at 959-78; see also D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN
LAW 632 (2d ed. 1980) (stating that courts are unwilling "to extend Title VII remedies beyond
blue-collar workers").
195. See generally Bartholet, supra note 9, at 1026 ("argues that there is no legal basis for
distinguishing between upper and lower level selection methods").
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scribe employment discrimination are clear, 196 modern America con-
tinues to be plagued with intolerable discriminatory practices in the
workplace.' 97 The application of the common law right-to-control
test, the hybrid test, 198 and the partnership indicia test results in a
restrictive and inaccurate interpretation of the term "employee."
Moreover, the legislative history, purpose, and language of the federal
employment discrimination statutes do not support the application of
these tests. 199
The effect of the courts' current refusal to permit partners to
invoke the protections of Title VII, the ADEA, or the Equal Pay Act,
even if the employment realities demonstrate that a partner is in need
of protection, is that equal employment opportunity, the express goal
of the statutes, is severely undermined. Women and minorities have
been the traditional victims of employment discrimination in this
country. 0° Under the restrictive tests of employee status that courts
196. By enacting Title VII, Congress sought "to achieve equality of employment
opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group
of white employees over other employees." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30
(1971) (discussing the expansiveness of Title VII's protections). The Equal Pay Act "was
intended as a broad charter of women's rights in the economic field. It sought to overcome the
age-old belief in women's inferiority and to eliminate the depressing effects on living standards
of reduced wages for female workers and the economic and social consequences which flow
from it." Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 265 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905
(1970). Finally, Congress enacted the ADEA in light of the disadvantages suffered by the
elderly in the workplace. Congress outlined the ADEA's background and purpose as follows:
"[I]n the face of rising productivity and affluence, older workers find themselves disadvantaged
in their efforts to retain employment .... It is therefore the purpose of this chapter to promote
employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age." 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1982).
197. J. FERNANDEZ, SURVIVAL IN THE CORPORATE FISHBOWL 130 (1987) ("Racism and
sexism continue to be two of the most powerful and complex social forces affecting American
society."); A. PINKNEY, supra note 159, at 66 ("Although there has been a decline in
prejudiced attitudes toward blacks and some decline in discrimination against them, both
remain widespread and account for many of the differences between blacks and whites in
income, employment, education, housing, health, and other sectors of the society."); S. SLAVIN
& M. PRADT, THE EINSTEIN SYNDROME: CORPORATE ANTI-SEMITISM IN AMERICA TODAY
2 (1982) (positing that "contrary to popular belief, there is still a substantial amount of
discrimination against Jews in large corporations"); B. WILLIAMS, BLACK WORKERS IN AN
INDUSTRIAL SUBURB: THE STRUGGLE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION 10 (1987) ("[W]hite
businessman aversion to blacks is not necessarily limited to workers with low human capital.
Employer discrimination against blacks of all skill levels persists in spite of civil rights gains.
Human capital, therefore, fails to account for the persistent discrimination in the workplace.");
see also BELL, supra note 194,- at 636 ("For blacks and other nonwhites seeking access to
higher paying, higher status positions, Title VII has not proved to be particularly useful. To
the extent that the white elite still hold most of the more desirable positions of employment in
this country, Title VII has posed little threat to the status quo.").
198. For an argument that the traditional common law right-to-control test and the hybrid
test should be rejected, see generally Dowd, supra note 155.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 161-66.
200. See J. FERNANDEZ, supra note 197, at 121-29 (discussing the history of racism and
sexism in American society); see also P. Cox, supra note 4, at 1.02 ("The primary
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currently utilize, women and minorities who have labored hard to
attain partner status may lose that status because these tests do not
give partners the protections afforded to employees under the federal
employment discrimination statutes. Furthermore, partnerships can
deliberately circumvent the employment discrimination laws and the
Supreme Court's decision in Hishon v. King & Spalding by merely
promoting their undesirable associates to partnership status, only to
terminate them subsequently because they are black, Hispanic, Jew-
ish, Catholic, female, or too old. These discriminatory attitudes, of
course, would be disguised as proper partnership decisions. Further-
more, the sham exception to the per se rule that Justice Powell identi-
fied does not adequately protect against such discrimination because
many partnerships are large enough to absorb the cost of maintaining
the undesirables as partners until the "sham period"' ' expires. Also,
what one court may consider a sham, another court may consider a
bona fide partner relationship. The courts, in effect, are closing their
eyes to the discriminatory practices that Congress sought to prohibit
by their refusal to regard partners as employees in circumstances that
mandate such protection.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts are currently faced with the problem of deciding whether
to permit partners to invoke the protections afforded to employees
under Title VII, the ADEA, and the Equal Pay Act. The majority of
courts that have addressed the issue have been reluctant to equate
partners with employees. This hesitance has resulted from the appli-
cation of various judicially created tests that largely ignore the pro-
phylactic goals of the statutes. Futhermore, the application of these
tests is inconsistent with both the language and legislative history of
the statutes. The proper test for determining employee status in the
context of employment discrimination is the economic realities test.
Under this flexible test, a partner may be an employee if the partner-
ship exerts the requisite control over his employment opportunities
within the partnership. Such a partner, if exposed to proscribed dis-
criminatory conduct, may invoke the protections afforded to employ-
ees under the federal employment discrimination statutes.
TROY D. FERGUSON
congressional purpose underlying enactment of the statute [Title VII] was to prohibit
employment discrimination against the historical victims of such discrimination: women and
racial, ethnic and religious minorities.").
201. This is the period during which employers label employees as partners solely to
circumvent the employment discrimination laws.
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